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It would be futile for the law to attempt to deal in detail by
way of precise anticipatory rule with each of the infinite num-
ber of cases which can be classified as "negligence" cases., The
number of such situations in which the quality of conduct can be
measured by standards stated in terms *of conduct is relatively
small.2 The torrents of pertinent factors incident to any whole-
sale attempt along this line are beyond classification and state-
ment.3 The qualities of personality are themselves numerous;
their shadings are countless; the conduct of individuals is incal-
culable at present in its variety; the possible combinations of
these are literally infinite, as infinite as space and time. The
number of instances of conduct which could be labelled either
as negligent or non-negligent is beyond the limits of any catalog
1 The term "negligence" is employed in two distinct senses. In the first
place it serves to cover that division of the field of tort liability roughly
classified as "unintended harms" as opposed to "intended harms." But
the division of "unintended harms" itself is made up of three segments
which in turn are roughly classified as "accidental harms", "negligent
harms," and harms on account of which "absolute liability" is imposed.
The "negligence" category is the most important of this division and its
dominance is reflected by the tendency to speak of all these cases as
"negligence cases." It represents the most expansible and extensive single
division of the law. Thousands of the most varied cases are so classified.
A great many difficulties cluster about the devices employed for making
distinctions between the cases of these neighboring categories.
The second usage of the term is more restricted. It indicates merely one
of the elements disclosed by an analysis of a "negligence" case. These
elements are: (1) the right-duty element, (2) invasion of plaintiff's.
right or violation of defendant's duty (the 'negligence' issue), (3) causal
relation, and (4) damages. See Newton Auto Co. v. Herrick, 212 N. W.
680 (Iowa, 1927); Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Cash's Adm'x, 299 S. W. 590
(Ky. 1927); GREEN, RATIONAiE OF PRoxXruATE CAusE (1927) 2. The negli-
gence issue is the distinguishing factor in this class of cases and tends
to overshadow all the other elements.
2 These instances are largely confined to police regulations as the "Stop,
Look and Listen" rule, speed limits, sale of poisons, and the like. In these
cases precision of conduct is highly desirable. But even here the possible
situations are so many that the integrity of those hard and fast rules is
not infrequently violated. See Hinton v. Southern Ry., 172 N. C. 5B7, 90
S. E. 756 (1916); Standard Oil Co. v. Roberts, 107 S. E. 838 (Va. 1921).
3 "But since it is impossible to anticipate the innumerable combinations
of circumstances which may arise, it is impossible for the law to formu-
late in advance definite standards by which the propriety of conduct
under every conceivable set of circumstances may be judged." Bohlen,
Mized Questions of Law and Fact (1924) 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 113.
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the law can make. So it is not surprising that in the face of in-
finity the law does exactly what other sciences do in like situa-
tions. It adopts a formula; a formula in terms which will per-
mit its problems to be reduced to a graspable size. This formula,
like many other formulas, tends quickly to become ritual and
it would seem ithat it is only this ritual which holds the law's
interest. This much it insists upon rigorously, but this is as
far as the law's science goes in this direction. It seems to have
no interest in the "physical, mental and moral" qualities and
characteristics of personality as such, nor in the qualities and
characteristics of the "ordinary prudent person." 4 And while
it is intellectually stimulating to inquire into the intelligence,
experience, powers of memory, observation, coordination, the
reaction time, self-control, courage, skill, ad infinitum, which the
law might require of defendants, such inquiry is rendered utterly
without profit for the purposes of determining the negligent con-
duct of any particular defendant in any particular case. The law
does not make any attempt to require any of them in any one
or more combinations. A formula in these terms has not been
written which can be relied on to fit a single defendant in a
single case.
Legal analysis and classification have two immediate functions.
First, they develop and bring to the surface the significant
factors of a problem so that judgment can the more readily be
passed. They discourage passing judgment in bulk, hence facili-
4 Two recent studies by able legal scholars have subjected "negligence"
to most painstaking analyses. Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and
Indifference; The Relation of Mental States to Negligence (1926) 39 HAReV.
L. REV. 849; Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective (1927) 41 HAnv.
L. REv. 1. See also Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children
(1928) 37 YALE LAW JOuRNAL 618. See also numerous writers on the
general subject as listed by Professor Edgerton.
After surveying the views of a long list of writers to the effect that
negligence is or involves or consists of a mental state, Professor Edgerton
concludes: "I submit that all this is erroneous. Negligence neither is nor
involves ("presupposes") either indifference, or inadvertence, or any other
mental characteristic, quality, state or process. Negligence is unreason-
ably dangerous conduct-i. e., conduct abnormally likely to cause harm.
Freedom from negligence (commonly called "due care") does not require
care, or any other mental phenomenon, but requires only that one's con-
duct be reasonably safe-as little likely to cause harm as the conduct
of a normal person would be." Edgerton, ibid. 852.
Professor Seavey undertakes to ascertain: " . . . how far the con-
duct of one charged with negligence is tested in the light of his individual
qualities and how far his peculiar qualities are ignored, and incidentally
to deal with certain terms which are in customary use." Seavey, ibid. 1.
Along with "the man of ordinary prudence" these writers consider at
length such terms as care, reasonableness, risk, danger, foresight, intelli-
gence, belief, knowledge, skill, memory, powers of observation, self-con-
trol, quickness of reaction, and a long list of other "physical, mental and
moral" (Seavey) qualities and characteristics.
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tate accuracy and consistency on the part of judge, counsel and
scholar. Second, they permit the articulation of judgments so
that they can be understood and employed for future guidance.
They are at most machinery, but machinery for the employment
of that ungraspable and indefinable power we call law- by which
the conduct of social beings is brought under cortrol. As ma-
chinery there is nothing sacred about such devices, but their
value cannot be over-emphasized, and if they are poorly designed
the same harmful results follow as in the employment of poor
machinery in making use of other highly dangerous forms of
power.5
In the trial of a negligence case, the negligence issue may
come to the surface at any one or more of five possible stages.6
At four of these it demands the judgment of the judge; at the
other, that of the jury. First, the judge may be called upon
to determine whether some so-called definite standard set up by
legislature or court, as for instance some traffic regulation,'
controls this issue. If the case falls under such a crystallized
rule, judgment on the negligence issue is automatic in those
states which recognize the negligence per se doctrine, the in-
quiry being merely whether the party violated the terms of the
regulation., Second, the judge may be required in any case to
5The abstractions of the laws are hard to handle. Concepts whether
vague or precise are imperiled by the very words to which they are intrusted.
Any adequate science of law awaits a science of statement. The definitions
of scholars are sieves, the opinions of judges little more than a succession
of mirages, even the precedents by which the course of judicial decision is
determined are equally expansible and collapsible. But analysis and classifi-
cation are indispensable. Though they retard the very progrezs they would
promote, they are nevertheless the machinery through which the law and
lawyers function. They are the most reliable aids to passing judgment, but
they can never take the place of judgment.
6 It is conceivable that there might be a sixth situation; that involved
in the admission of evidence on this issue. The point will be adverted
to later in the discussion.
7B. & 0. R. R. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24 (1927), opinion
by Justice Holmes, requiring a traveller approaching a blind railroad
crossing to "stop, get out and go see," is a good example of this sort of
forniula set up by a court. Such formulas whether by court or legislature
are of tremendous value, for they state the standard of conduct in terms
of conduct itself. They make it possible to care for a large part of the
every day business of the courts speedily, and especially so as to frequently
recurring cases involving the violation of police regulations. But they
may give rise to very difficult problems. For instance, it is not at all
certain but that the formula announced by Justice Holmes is so belated as
to be out of harmony with present day thinking. Are not underpass or
overhead crossings or watchmen the price of exercising the high right-,
powers and privileges of the railroad business? Jones v. Boston & Dr. R. R.,
139 Atl. 214 (N. H. 1927); see Green, Contributory Negligcmcc and Proxi-
mate Cause (1927) 6 N. C. L. REV. 3, '0.
8 But not in those states which do not recognize the negligence p~r se
1032 YALE LAW JOURNAL
decide whether under all the evidence the case on this issue
should go to the jury. Is there a negligence issue for decision?
This question is resolved by the well understood "reasonable in-
ference" forriula,9 or its equivalent. Third, if the issue is made
by the evidence the judge is required to translate it to the jury
for their judgment.10 Fourth, the jury must pass their judg-
ment on the issue. Fifth, the judge may write an opinion artic-
ulating the judgment passed on the whole case, including the
negligence issue. At this last stage the scene of action normally
has changed to the appellate court with the appellate judge
either approving or disapproving, in so far as the negligence
issue is involved, the trial judge's action in dealing with one
of the situations in the trial court, most usually the second or
third. What is said by judges at this stage cannot be taken too
literally.1
Although the jury has been utilized to save the judge the pains
of passing judgment on the negligence issue, relatively the most
important of the so called "fact" issues, nevertheless, the prob-
lems raised by this issue must be translated to the jury in each
case. The difficulties which the jury device creates for the law
doctrine. In those states, the third situation is presented. See Bourne v.
Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 95 N. E. 404 (1911); Knupfle v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., 84 N. Y. 488 (1881); Ubelmann v. American Ice Co., 209 Pa.
398 (1904).
9 Metropolitan Ry. V. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193 (1877); McDonald v.
Metropolitan St. Ry., 167 N. Y. 66, 60 N. E. 282 (1901); Davis v. Margo-
lis, 140 Atl. 823 (Conn. 1928). See infra note 15 for discussion of the
value of this formula.
3o It is reasonably certain that Professor Edgerton was dealing with
this situation. "The result of the case must many times depend on whether
they (juries) are given to understand that negligence is indifference or
inadvertence." Edgerton, op. cit. supra note 4, at 860. "Confronted with
such a definition-the intelligent juryman will gather either that negli-
gence is or that it necessarily involves, relative indifference or relative
inattention. . . " Ibid. 861. "Innocent of the law's Pickwickian senses,
juries must often take literally the definitions which are given them, with
the result that the law in action tends more strongly than the law in bools
to make particular mental phenomena necessary, if not sufficient, to negli-
gence." Ibid. 870.
While Professor Seavey does not commit himself so clearly, inasmuch
as he is dealing with the machinery incident to jury trial, he also must
have this situation in mind. He says as much: "As will be pointed out
later, the courts have not done this, but while asking the triers of fact
to apply an external test as to some elements, as to others they have per-
mitted consideration of the actor's qualities." Seavey, op. cit. supra note
4, at 5.
2 "It is not always safe to take an excerpt from an opinion and embody
it in an instruction, because the opinion is addressed to lawyers, while
the instruction is addressed to laymen." Magrane v. St. Louis & S. R. R.,
183 Mo. 119, 128, 81 S. W. 1158, 1159 (1904). See Birmingham Ry., Light
& Power Co. v. Barrett, 4 Ala. App. 347, 58 So. 760 (1912).
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are seldom realized and cannot be exaggerated. The negligence
issue gives its greatest difficulty in this translation process. The
incisive studies of Professors Edgerton and Seavey have their
relevancy, if at all, at this point.22 These writers were inquiring
into the quality or nature of the conduct which (the other ele-
ments being present) will impose or defeat responsibility, and
how far the parties' own characteristics and qualities of per-
sonality affect the imposition or defeat of such responsibility.
Since this is the jury's problem when there is any evidence
raising the issue, how is the judge to translate it to the jury?
This is a most practical question. Professor Edgerton objects
to the instruction of juries in terms which make mental qualities
and characteristics pertinent to the determination of the issue.
He insists on "objective conduct" and "objective tests." ,3 Pro-
fessor Seavey, on the other hand, says that there is "only in
part an objective test; that there is no such thing as reason-
able conduct except as viewed with reference to certain qualities
of the actor." 24 Under either view how can the jury be given
its problem? Neither writer reaches this point.
Conceivably a judge might follow one of two radically op-
posite methods. He might make use of very accurate and pre-
cise rules, expressed in terms of conduct and qualities of per-
sonality by which the jury might measure the particular con-
duct of the person in question. For instance, he might say:
"Gentlemen, if you find that defendant was possessed of an in-
telligence quotient of more than 90, and average reaction time
to visual and auditory stimuli of .22 sec. and .2 sec. respectively,
and a score of over 70 in mechanical abilities, and a grade of not
less than C in caution and self control, and that he failed to
conduct himself in accordance with these standards in the case
before you, then you will find for plaintiff." Such instructions
would be varied to suit the case. No doubt the judge would
do some such thing if psychology could supply the law with
dependable measurements and standards. On the other hand,
the judge might merely say to the jury: "Gentlemen, this is
your problem. You have heard the evidance. Give us your
judgment." Either method might serve as well as the method
which is now employed. But judges have employed neither:
1S supra notes 4 and 10.
13Aside from other considerations, if Professor Edgerton in the e.xcerpt
first quoted, supra note 4, intended to lay down a formula for use in de-
termining the negligence issue, it is very clear that it is too broad. If
"negligence is unreasonably dangerous conduct," it would includ2 "intended
harms" as well. On the other hand, why "conduct abnrzizally likely to
cause harm?" Is not "conduct normally dangerous" enough? Als if men-
tal phenomena are factors in conduct, what is the point in excluding them
from consideration?
.4 See infra note 24.
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the one is clearly impossible, the other seems too dangerous.
They have been more careful. Judges feel that laymen not
only need assistance in handling these problems, but they must
be kept within bounds. They cannot be permitted to roam at
will nor to feel that they have an unlimited power in reaching
judgment. Thus, judges have developed a technique of instruct-
ing juries as to the considerations (law) which shall guide them
in their judgment. It is here, therefore, that there is a necessity
for the ritualistic formula mentioned in the beginning. But in
employing this ritual a judge is faced with two difficulties. In
the first place, in order not to pass judgment himself on the very
person and conduct involved in litigation, and thereby render the
jury's function pointless, he must raise conduct to terms of the
law's abstractions: "care", "prudence", "forseeability", "rea-
sonableness," and the like. But having converted the problem
into such terms, he must then make these high abstractions in-
telligible to the jury. And to do this, judges attempt to objectify
these abstractions. It was in this predicament that the "man
of ordinary prudence" was conceived as a standard of conduct."
He looks like a real fellow, the model of mankind. He is gen-
erally so considered. He is called the "objective" as opposed
to the "subjective" standard. But all of this is due to vivid
language. He is a mere figure of speech.16
The "man of ordinary prudence" with slight variations in his
verbal attire is used by all courts in testing the negligence
issue unless precluded by an automatic formula as adverted to
above. The court instructs the jury that "negligence is the
failure to do what an ordinary prudent person would have done
under the circumstances or the doing of that which an ordinarily
prudent person would not have done." "I If more is required
15 See Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N. C. 468 (1837) and cases there dis-
cussed. The law frequently adopts this sort of device when it comes face
to face with an otherwise uncontrollable flood of factors which have to be
considered in all sorts of cases. For instance, in determining whether a
case shall go to a jury on the negligence, or other issue, the law gives
the judge no help except by way of one of these formulas. The judge is told
to determine whether the evidence will support two reasonable inferences,
whether reasonable minds can differ on the evidence. It does this because
there is no way of stating beforehand in the run of cases any exact
test. The factors are too numerous and relative. Even rulings on
analogous situations are likely to prove deceptive here. The judge can-
not escape passing judgment at this point, and the formula does not
give him any assistance in weighing the factors of the particular case. It
merely tells him that he must do so. The same thing may be said of
the "preponderance of evidence," and "beyond a reasonable doubt" rules,
and -many others.
1 MThayer, Public Wrong And Private Action (1914) 27 HARV. L. REV.
317.
17 See RANDALL, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES (1922) § 4049 et seq. for a long
list of these monotonous instructions from many jurisdictions.
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the court simply expands the same idea into other terms as
"reasonableness", "care", "anticipation of harm", "danger,"
finally developing some such formula as Brett's generalization
in Heaven v. Pender.8 The courts do all they can to make these
terms sound like vivid, living realties, but each is nothing more
than an objectification of a major abstraction. These phrases
differ slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but not mater-
ially so, and in any particular jurisdiction the pattern adopted
will be found to be followed along the closest lines. In fact the
insistence of the courts upon nice shadings of these terms tends
to turn the science of law into a jargon of quibbles. Most remark-
able of all, the courts will allow no explanation of the central
figure of this constellation of figments, "the man of ordinary
prudence," by comparison with any real person or by describing
him as possessing any other qualities or combination of quali-
ties.19 The farthest extreme to which courts will go in this
direction is illustrated in Grad. Trzwnk Ry. v. Ives. After charg-
ing the jury in words practically identical with those indicated
18 "Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position
with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did
think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and
skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause
danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to
use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger." Heaven v. Pender, 11
Q. B. D. 503, 509 (1883). See also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916). And a failure to use such care and skill
is negligence.
19 The care and prudence which the law regards as "ordinary" is such
as prudent men are accustomed to exercise on like occasions-not such "as
men generally," not such as "any man of ordinary care and attention," not
"what a man of ordinary care would have done, riding as plaintiff was,"
etc., not "the usual order of ordinary care observed, by men generally."
A man of ardinary care, of ordinary prudence, as expressed in common
parlance, is not regarded by the law as being to the common understanding
the same as characterized by the expression "a prudent man", "prudent
men." Reynolds v. City of Burlington, 52 Vt. 300, 303 (1880). See numer-
ous cases to the same general effect: Hennesey v. Chicago & N. 'W. Ry.,
99 Wis. 109, 74 N. W. 554 (1898); City of Paris v. Tucker, 93 S. W. 233
(Tex. Civ. App. 1906); Cohn v. City of Kansas, 108 Mo. 387, 18 S. W.
973 (1891); Langhammer v. City of Manchester, 99 Iowa 295, 68 N. W.
688 (1896); Austin & N. W. R. R. v. Beatty, 73 Tex. 592, 11 S. W. 858
(1889); St. Louis, A. & T. R. R. v. Finley, 79 Tex. 85, 15 S. W. 266
(1890); Louisville R. R. v. Gower, 85 Tenn. 465, 3 S. W. 824 (1837). See
Mertz v. Connecticut Co., 217 N. Y. 475, 112 N. W. 166 (1916). "While
in some jurisdictions the ordinary usage or custom of the business or
occupation is made the test of negligence, the weight of authority is that
as negligence is the doing or failure to do what ordinarily prudent men
would do under the same circumstances, the test of ordinary custom, while
relevant and admissible in evidence is not controlling, especially when the
custom is clearly a careless or dangerous one." Sea Board Air Line
Ry. v. Watson, 113 So. 716, 718 (Fla. 1927) ; see Commanche Duke Oil Co.
v. Texas & Pac. C. & 0. Co., 298 S. W. 554, 563 (Tex. Cora. App. 1927).
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above, the court gave this further instruction, which was claimed
to be erroneous:
"You fix the standard for reasonable, prudent and cautious
men under the circumstances of the case as you find them, ac-
cording to your judgment and experience of what that class of
men do under these circumstances, and then test the conduct in-
volved and try it by that standard; and neither the judge who
tries the case nor any other person can supply you with the
criterion of judgment by any opinion he may have on that sub-
ject." 20
This charge is somewhat too literal for most courts. They do
not care to be so plain about a matter which at best has an air of
mysticism about it. With more than the usual liberality shown
by most courts, the Supreme Court in passing on this charge,
said:
"But it seems to us that the instruction was correct, as an
abstract principle of law, and was also applicable to the facts
brought out at the trial of the case. There is no fixed standard
in the law by which a court is enabled to arbitrarily say in every
case what conduct shall be considered reasonable and prudent,
and what shall constitute ordinary care, under any and all cir-
cumstances. The terms 'ordinary care', 'reasonable prudence,'
and such like terms, as applied to the conduct and affairs of men,
have a relative significance, and cannot be arbitrarily defined.
What may be deemed ordinary care in one case, may, under
different surroundings and circumstances be gross negligence.
The policy of the law has relegated the determination of such
questions to the jury under proper instructions from the court.
It is their province to note the special circumstances and sur-
roundings of each particular case, and then say whether the
conduct of the parties in that case was such as would be expected
of reasonable, prudent men, under a similar state of affairs.
When a given state of facts is such that reasonable men may
fairly differ upon the question as to whether there was negli-
gence or not, the determination of the matter is for the jury." 21
Nothing is more obvious from a reading of the cases than
that courts desire to pass the negligence issue to the jury as
free from any commitments as possible and yet subjecting the
jury to as much control as possible. That expansible and all
inclusive phrase "under the same or similar circumstances" -2 is
20 144 U. S. 408, 416, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 682 (1891). See St. Louis, I. X,.
& So. Ry. v. Spearman, 64 Ark. 332, 42 S. W. 406 (1897).
21Accord: Gallagher v. G. N. Ry., 212 N. W. 839 (N. D. 1927);
Crowley v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R., 213 N. W. 403 (Iowa, 1927); B. C. & A.
Ry. v. Turner, 136 Atl. 609 (Md. 1927); Commanche Duke Oil Co. v. T. &
P. Coal.& Oil Co., supra note 19; Hults v. Miller, 299 S. W. 85 (Mo. App.
1927).
22 "The rule has been repeatedly laid down that no definition is completo
or correct which does not embody that element." Yerkes v. Northern Pac,
R. R., 112 Wis. 184, 193, 88 N. W. 33, 36 (1901). See Garland v. Boston
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employed as a blanket for every pertinent factor, and the courts
seldom undertake to enumerate these factors. Under this phrase,
the "ordinary prudent person" may be endowed if necessary
with the very qualities of the party whose conduct is to be
measured. If the party is blind, crippled, deaf, small, strong,
nervous, experienced, aged, intelligent, stupid, or whatnot, this
is but one of the circumstances under which the "ordinary pru-
dent person" must act.23 This personified standard sounds like
& M. R. R., 76 N. H. 556, 86 Atl. 141 (1913). As to duty to use "care and
prudence of a prudent man in view of all the circumstances" in an
emergency, see Landry v. Hubert, 137 Atl. 97 (Vt. 1927); Peabody v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 261 Pac. 261 (Mlont. 1927). "The existence of an
emergency is merely one of the factors in the light of which the conduct
of the actor must be judged." Jones v. Boston & M. R. R., aupra
note 7, at 22L23 There is nothing in Vaughn v. Menlove, supra note 15, contradictory of
this statement or of the following numerous sustaining statements. In
Vaughn v. Menlove the only question involved is as to the proper method
of leaving the issue to the jury. But the "under the circumstances" of
that case allowed the jury to consider defendant's bona fides, his judgment,
knowledge, etc., as is done in other cases. The court very correctly per-
ceived the impossibility of stating a rule for ach person. But that impos-
sibility does not in any manner avoid the fact that if defendant in such
a case were a poor, ignorant "Brazos bottom" negro farmer on the one
hand, or a prosperous agricultural chemi-t on the other, such would be a
most vital factor in the case, although the judge would give the same
formula in each instance.
"In other words, every person must use that degrec of care which
prudent persons of his class, taking all circumstances into account, includ-
ing health, strength and habits of body and of mind, would use, vhEn
acting prudently." SHmRAR 1 & REDrmLD, NEGLIcrxm (Street's 6th ed.
1913) § 88.
"The jury ought to be possessed of the real facts including the age, the
condition, the knowlcdge, the experience and capacity rf the person injured,
and then ought to be allowed to say whether, undtr all the circumstances,
he acted reasonably or unreasonably; and thie, in point of fact, is the
theory upon which nearly all cases are trid." THOraPso, NEaLIG5NCO
(1901) § 338.
"If we apply to her the standard of what ordinarily careful women of her
age and experience would do under like circumstances, how can we can-
elude that she was careless?" Kitsap County Transp. Co. v. Harvey, 15
F. (2d) 166, 168 (C. C. A. 9th), 48 . L. R. 1420 (1927) annotation. (This
was a women 73 years old, who fell while getting out of her seat which
was set on a platform 10 inches high from the fioor of the boat No doubt
the jury had many experiences of this sort by which to sEt up a standard
for the old lady).
"The plaintiff is to be held to the exercise of the degrce of care of which
he was capable. If he was merely a person of dull mind, who could ]alaor
for his own livelihood, and there was no apparent necessity of putting him
under the protection of a guardian to keep him out of harm's way, hc is
chargeable with the same degree of care for his personal safety as one of
brighter intellect, as any attempt to frame and adapt varyibg ridec of
responsibility to varying degrees of intelligence would ncecesarily involre
confusion and uncertainty in the law." Worthington & Co. v. Mencer, 96
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Ala. 310, 315, 11 So. 72, 73 (1891). (Plaintiff was mentally weak. The
seeming contradiction between the first sentence and the last vanishes when
it is considered that the court in the last sentence had in mind the difficulty
of stating the law for varying situations). The courts constantly make the
distinction between degree of care and quantum of diligence. See Gulf, C.
& S. Ry. v. Smith, 87 Tex. 348, 28 S. W. 520 (1894).
In Hassenyer v. Michigan Central R. R., 48 Mich. 205, 209 (1882) the
court said: "But while the authorities permit all the circumstances to be
taken into account, age and sex among the rest, in determining the degree
of one to be reasonably required or looked for, no case, so far as we know,
has ever laid it down as a rule of law that less care is required of a
woman than of a man." Judge Cooley, for the court, was here commenting
on a charge approved by Snow v. Provincetown, 120 Mass. 580, 585 (1876)
to this effect: "Care implies attention and caution, and ordinary care in
such a degree of attention and caution as a person of ordinary prudence
of the plaintiff's sex and age would commonly and might reasonably bo
expected to exercise under like circumstances." Judge Cooley adds: "This
no doubt is true."
"It would thus appear that thougl" defendant was partially blind and
illiterate, yet, if by the exercise of a prudent diligence and regard for his
own rights, he might have protected himself against the fraud and imposi-
tion of the agent of the windmill company, it was his duty to do so; other-
wise he will not be protected." Kalamazoo Nat. Bank v. Clark, 52 Mo. App.
593, 598 (1893). Again: "The evidence in this respect was, it seems to us,
quite weak . . . The defendant seems to have blindly trusted the whole
matter to the integrity of the agent, of the windmill company... Notwith-
standing this, the jury may have concluded that since there was evidence
before them tending to show that defendant was a man far advanced in
life ... whose mental powers were bordering on imbecility; whose sense of
sight was so dimmed by the infirmities of his great age that he could not
see to read, or if he could see he would be unable to do so on account of
his illiteracy, that he had exercised ordinary care and prudence under the
circumstances . . . These circumstances are elements that would naturally
enter into the consideration by the jury of the question of negligence."
Ibid. 599, 600.
"In determining the existence of such negligence, we are not to hold the
plaintiff liable for faults which arise from inherent or mental defects, or
want of capacity to appreciate what is and what is not negligence, but only
to hold him to the exercise of such faculties and capacities as he is
endowed with by nature for the avoidance of danger... Hence the plaintiff
is liable only for the proper use of his own faculties and what may be
justly held to be contributory negligence in one is not necessarily such in
another. There is no hard and fast rule applicable to every one under like
circumstances." Baltimore & Potomac R. R. v. Cumberland, 176 U. S. 232,
238, 20 Sup. Ct. 380, 382 (1899). (Plaintiff was a boy 12 years old). But
the dictum is broad. It was applied to a mentally deficient adult in Seattle
Electric ,Co. v. Hovden, 190 Fed. 7 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911).
See Keith v. Worcester St. R. R., 196 Mass. 478, 82 N. E. 680 (1907);
Masterson v. Lennon, 115 Wash. 305, 197 Pac. 38 (1921); Balcom v. City
of Independence, 178 Iowa 685, 160 N. W. 305 (1916) (defective sight; the
last case considers many cases). As to defective hearing, see Kerr v.
Connecticut Co., 140 At. 751 (Conn. 1928). "Age, defective vision, or
hearing, or other infirmity, are circumstances to be considered by the jury
in determining whether due care and caution have been exercised. The
existence of one or more of these infirmities does not require a higher
dfegree of care and caution than in the case of one having no infirmities."
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an absolute one, but it turns out to be a variable. Nevertheless
it enables the jury to pass judgment on the party's conduct in
the light of the sort of person that party is. It is thus an adapt-
able standard, and thereby a workable one. Whether this be
objective or subjective perhaps no two people could agree, but
neither is it necessary that they should.2'
In cases of children and extreme abnormals of any hind
(whether above or below the normal) the "ordinary prudent
person" places too big a strain on the imagination, so the courts
make a very rational adjustment or "reconciliation." The
standard then becomes in case of the child that of the "ordinary
child of the particular child's age, intelligence and experience," 5
while the physician must bestow "that reasonable care, skill and
Rosenthal v. Chicago & A. R. R., 255 fI. 552, 560, 99 N. E. 072, 675 (1912).
But ef. Toledo P. & W. R. R. v. Hammet, 220 Ii1. 9, 77 N. E. 72 (1906);
O'Connor v. Hickey, 156 N. E. 838 (Mass. 1927). See Texas & N. 0. R. 1.
v. Bean, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 341, 119 S. AV. 328 (1909) (club foot of plaintiff
merely one of the circumstances bearing on his contributory ncglignce).
24 Professor Seavey concludes: "Reviewing the whole raatter bricly, it
would appear that there is no standardized nan; that there is c-nly in part
an objective test; that there is no such thing as rcasonable or unreasnable
conduct except as viewed with reference to certain qualities of the actor-
his physical attributes, probably, if superior, his intellectual power, his
knowledge and the knowledge he would have acquired had he exerckicd
standard moral and at least average mental qualities at the time of action
or at some connected time." Seavey, op. cit. supra note 4, at 27.
Certainly the party's conduct in question cannot be tested by his own
lights, for no one besides himself can possibly know what they are. Hence
the standard cannot be subjective in that sense. But on the other hand,
this conduct can only be tested by the jury's capacity for passing judg-
ment. Hence in this sense the standard cannot be other than subjective.
It is difficult to see how the standard could be objective in any sense unles
all that is meant is that the jury's standard is applied to the party's
conduct. But is the point worth settling?25 
"No court ever says that a child is to be held to the measure of care
which the particular child in question ordinarily exercises. On the con-
trary, the courts always state the measure with some objectivity. The
usual statement is that a child is held to the exercise of the degrees of care
which ordinary children of his age, intelligence and exiperience (or whatever
combination is used) ordinarily exercise under similar circumstances. Some-
times it is the care which is reasonably to be expected of children of his
age, experience and intelligence. Sometimes it is the care of the class of
persons to which the injured belongs. Sometimes it is the care of ordinary
prudent and careful children of his age, experience and so forth; or of the
great mass of children of his age, and so forth." Shulman, The Standard
of Care required of Children (1928) 37 YALE LAW JOURNAL 618, 622. "The
mental capacity, the knowledge and ex\perience of the particular child, are
to be taken in consideration in each case. These qualities are individualized
-subjective-but only for the purpose of determining whether or not the
child was capable of perceiving the risk of injury to himself and of avoid-
ing the danger. Beyond that, there is an objective standard." Ibid. 625.
Is not the writer taking the objective method of stating the test too
seriously?
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diligence as physicians in the same neighborhood, in the same
general line of practice, ordinarily have and exercise in like
cases." 2r In other words, the courts come as near as they dare
saying to the jury that they must pass judgment on the partic-
ular plaintiff or defendant. But courts do and must insist that
this standard, however it may be adjusted, must be kept a pure
abstraction. If it becomes anything else, then the courts would
either be compelled to state a standard in terms of the qualities
and characteristics of human conduct, a thing they cannot do
and will not undertake to do, or else would be forced to ad-
mit that there is no standard which they can give the jury. This
latter also, is unthinkable, as it would immediately give the jury
too great latitude. The "man of ordinary prudence" can only
serve his function as an abstraction. In this way he is a mere
caution, pointing the jury in as dramatic a way as possible the
2G"The physician is bound to bring to the service of his patient and
apply to the case that degree of knowledge, skill, care and attention
ordinarily possessed and exercised by practitioners of the medical profes-
sion under like circumstances and in like localities." Nelson v. Sandell, 202
Iowa 109, 111, 209 N. W. 440, 441, 46 A. L. R. 1447 (1927) annotation.
"One who holds himself out as a specialist in the treatment of a certain
organ, injury, or disease is bound to bring to the aid of one so employing
him that degree of skill and knowledge which is ordinarily possessed by
those who devote special study and attention to that particular organ,
injury or disease, its diagnosis, and its treatment, in the same general
locality, having regard to the state of scientific knowledge at the time."
Rann v. Twitchell, 82 Vt. 79, 83, 71 Atl. 1045, 1046, 20 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1030
(1909) annotation. That is coming close home to the defendant. See
generally 37 L. R. A. 830 (1897) annotation; Kuechler v. Volgmann, 180
Wis. 238, 192 N. W. 1015, 31 A. L. R. 826 (1924) annotation; Loudon v.
Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 194 Pac. 488, 12 A. L. R. 1487 (1920) annotation. See
(1928) 6 TEx. L. REv. 398.
As to banks, see Bank of Monango v. Ellendale Nat. Bank, 52 N. D. 8,
201 N. W. 839, 40 A. L. R. 889 (1926) annotation.
As to places of amusements, see Carlin v. Smith, 148 Md. 524, 133 Atl.
340, 44 A. L. R. 193 (1926) annotation.
As to druggists, see Ohio County Drug Co. v. Howard, 201 Ky. 346, 256
S. W. 705, 31 A. L. R. 1355 (1924) annotation.
As to power companies furnishing electricity, see McAllister v. Pryor, 187
N. C. 832, 123 S. E. 92, 34 A. L. R. 25 (1925) annotation; 17 A. L. R.
833 (1922) annotation.
As to carriers, see Ormond v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 216 N. W.
489 (Wis. 1927) ; Gulf, C. & S. Ry. v. Conley, 113 Texas 472, 260 S. IV. 561,
32 A. L. R. 1183 (1924) annotation.
In many of these cases the courts are unwilling to leave the jury to
consider the great hazards of the activities involved merely as part of the
"circumstances." They translate "ordinary care" into superlatives, doubt-
less for the greater emphasis. Denver Electric Co. v. Simpson, 21 Colo.
371 (1895). See excellent opinion by Lairy, J., in Union Traction Co. v.
Berry, 188 Ind. 514, 121 N. E. 655, 32 A. L. R. 1171 (1924) annotation.
Also see excellent article, Frederick Green, High Care and Gross Negligence
(1928) 23 ILL. L. Rv. 4.
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directions their deliberations should take. The judge through
him can indicate to the jury that they are dealing with society's
power and not their own; therefore, they should act reasonably
and not let their own desires run riot. The formula is as much
for controlling the jury's deliberations as for measuring the
party's conduct. Its beauty is that it can be used for both
purposes without committing the judge to anything and with-
out telling the jury anything that amounts to more than a sober-
ing caution. It does exactly what any good ritual is designed
to do; its function is psychological. It serves as a prophylaxis.
Nothing more should be expected of it.
The "ordinary prudent person" seems, therefore, to have been
taken too literally. Both judges and legal scholars have under-
taken to analyze him into terms of human qualities. He and his
acompanying retinue of phrases are much like the points, lines
and spaces of geometry, and the X, Y and Zs of algebra. "Let
X equal the distance and Y the time, etc." Suppose some one
should suggest that this be analyzed, and should proceed to point
out that X and Y are letters of the alphabet, and further propose
to count the words in which each appears for the purpose of
determining their nature and characteristics. Or suppose some
one else should propose to put a ruler on all the Xs and a stop-
watch on all the Ys. Are not the "ordinary prudent person",
"reasonableness", "forseeability", "care", "danger", "same or
similar circumstances" etc. merely the Xs and Ys of the law
employed in negligence cases? Are not they used purely for
the purpose of reducing the problem to a statable form? First,
statement by trial judge to a jury in translating the negligence
issue for the jury's judgment. Second, statement in opinions
so that the process may be articulated for the purposes of a
record. The law's inability to deal with human behavior in
detail and "in the raw" compels it to deal with such behavior
for purposes of statement by the use of figures and symbols.
But the figures and symbols employed being the same as some
of those employed in describing specific details of human be-
havior, the two uses are confused.27 It is much as if numerals
27 Professor Edgerton makes this point very clear in his analysis of
"care" and other terms but complains about its "technical" meaning and
use. He says: "They (juries) are charged in terms that are wholly ambig-
uous and left to make their own selections among the competing theories."
Edgerton, op. cit. supra note 4, at 860. He correctly points out throughout
his article that the law is administered through 'words used in "Pick-
wickian senses."
Professor Seavey makes similar points: "Prudence has a selfish connota-
tion, obviously not intended here, except in the case of contributory neg-
ligence. 'Care' avoids this but obviously avoids reference to a possibility
of error as to valuation of interests. 'Sense' refers only to intellectual
elements. 'Skill' as will be indicated later, probably combines too many
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were used in the place of letters for algebraic purposes. But
does this use of these figures and symbols mean that the qualities
and characteristics of the human beings involved in the litiga-
tion are not to be considered by the jury in passing judgment?
Or does such use merely mean that such qualities and character-
istics ate of no moment in a statement of the law for use by the
judge in translating the issue to the jury? 28
On this point Professor Edgerton says:
"The individual's actual mental, characteristics and qualities,
capacities and habits, reactions and processes, are not, then,
among the 'circumstances' which the law considers in deter-
mining whether his conduct was, under the circumstances, rea-
sonably safe. He must behave as well (as safely) as if he were
in all mental respects normal, though he may be in some respects
super-normal. In fact, the broad proposition that no mental
fact about th6 (same) individual is material would seem to re-
quire only one substantial qualification; his special knowledge
is highly material." 29
Further:
"As Mr. Justice Holmes has said, 'when men live in society, a
certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities
going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general wel-
fare. If for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is
always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors,
no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts
of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors
than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accord-
ingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their stand-
ard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his per-
sonal equation into account' (Holmes, The Common Law 108).
Dean Pound has put as the 'jural postulate of civilized society'
which underlies our doctrine of negligence, that 'men must be
able to assume that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively,
will do so with due care, that is, with the care which the ordinary
elements for us to require the actor to have a standardized skill in all
situations." Seavey, op. cit. supra note 4, at 10.
See to same effect Shulman, op. cit. supra note 4, 625: "At any rate, it
(prudence) is a conveniently vague term to admit of adjustment to particu-
lar situations in a field of law where certainty in advance is not all-
important."
28 The jury device is probably the principal reason why formulas and
symbols must be used. In trial before a judge, nothing of this sort would
ordinarily appear prior to judgment. That he should employ for his own
purposes the rigmarole he uses in instructing juries, would only be under-
stood by reason of some brain pattern which he has built up through which
to think of such matters. But when he comes to articulate his judgment
in the form of an opinion, he is compelled to use some terminology, and
the same figures of speech which he employs for jury purposes are found
to be useful here. In both instances, it will be noted they are for the
purposes of statement, though with different ends in view.
29 Edgerton, op. cit. supra note 4, at 857.
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understanding and moral sense of the community exacts, with
respect to consequences that may be anticipated'." 20
These eminent authorities were doubtless postulating for the
purposes of statement. For this purpose, clearly the personal
qualities of each individual cannot be considered. But for the
purpose of judgment passing, the jury is beyond the realm of
statement, and that the awkwardness of the awkward man, the
poverty of the poor man, the stupidity of the dunce as well as
the skill of the expert, along with the special knowledge of the
specialist and the numerous other qualities of the person in-
volved, are all considered in our earthly courts is too well knovn
to leave a doubt. The difference lies between law in statement
and law in operation; between jural postulates and jury judg-
ments.
3 0a
What do the jury do with this terminology, "the ordinary
prudent person" and his "attendants," when they retire to the
jury room? Do they take them seriously? Show them any con-
sideration? Spend any time trying to determine that each juror
has the same "ordinary prudent person" in mind, or do they
merely assume that everyone is fully acquainted with him, and
that they know what the court desires? How any particular
jury arrive at their judgment is perhaps unknown even to them-
selves. But a "scientific" statement of law has very little if
any interest in how they shall treat these terms. The law
provides the jury with no table or key by which they can trans-
late these symbols into the terms of human conduct and human
qualities. The law recites its ritual and stops. Moreover, it
closes the door on the jury and guards them vith its officers.
A few rules of etiquette are provided,3' but no inquiry must be
made of the jurors themselves into their deliberations. What-
ever process they may go through, in the end the result is the
product of the jury's own judgment, and this is the law's judg-
ment so long as in reaching it the jury have observed the eti-
quette of the occasion. But it is only the law's judgment in the
particular case; it has no further currency. The next case will
have a like body to pass judgment. 2 In short, having developed
30 Ibid. 867, 868.
30aDean Pound appreciates this differenca fully. See Pound, Jmtice
Without Law (1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 696.
31 These rules include such prohibitions as communicating with the judge
except in open court, or discussing the case with third persons, accepting
favors from litigants, taking liquor into the jury-room, giving evidence in
the jury-room, deciding the case by the toss of a coin, the turn of a card or
other trick. In a few states, inquiry can be made directly of the jury as
to such objective conduct, but in no state can the factors impelling judg-
ment be gone into. See McBEAM, CASES ON TLarAL PnAcrics (1927) 853, 854.
- See Bohlen, Mixed Qvestoens of Law and Fact (1924) 72 U. PA. L.
REv. 111 et seq.; GsnuN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 72 et seq.
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an agency for giving judgment and a ritual for passing the
negligence issue to that agency for judgment, the factors which
the jury may take into account are of slight, if any, importance
in any scientific statement of the law. Here science is satisfied
with ritual; so long as the jury's judgment is not outrageous, it
stands. The law has been satisfied by the translation of one
of its important issues from judge to jury through the medium
of a figure of speech. No one should expect this figure of speech
to stand analysis except as a figure of speech. It cannot be dis-
sected into bone and blood, virtues and emotions, any more than
the motion picture we see on the screen. The particular figure
here involved serves its function when the jury has taken the
case. What juries do in reaching a judgment is wholly a differ-
ent thing, entirely unrelated. They pass into one of the "labora-
tories of justice" and there deal with actual human beings-
passing the judgment which the judge through the device of
picturesque language calls upon them to pass. It is their judg-
ment on the factors giving rise to the issue that the law desires-
nothing less and nothing more. If the law could tell them how
to pass this judgment it would have no need for them.
If the law (for purposes of statement) is merely interested
in having the judge pass the negligence issue to the jury in
doubtful cases under due cautions but without undue embarrass-
ment of the jury's power to deal with the issue as their judg-
ment may dictate, is it to be implied that the qualities and
characteristics of the conduct of the persons in litigation are of
no significance for the purposes of the jury? This cannot be.
They are factors of importance. Negligence cases are decided
every day in which they are considered by juries. Age, sex,
color, temperament, indifference, courage, intelligence, power of
observation, judgment, quickness of reaction, self control,
imagination, memory, deliberation, prejudices, experience,
health, education, ignorance, attractiveness, weakness, strength,
poverty, and any of the other possible assortments of qualities
and characteristics of the persons involved may each be a factor
in the jury's judgment on the negligence issue. It would doubt-
less be safe to go further and suggest that these same qualities
of both counsel and witnesses also have the greatest weight with
the jury. Litigants act on this assumption at any rate. But
the law does not undertake to analyze or weigh any of them
for the jury except in the most timid fashion. 33 They seldom
33 The cautionary charges given by courts are in recognition that some of
these factors are considered by juries. Charges that the jury must look
only to the evidence in the case, that they must try a case against a rail-
road the same as against an individual, are to be influenced by the facts
and not by sentiment, not to base their verdict upon own view of premises,
and similar ones, are but the efforts of judges to restrict the jury's delibera-
tions to the serious business of deciding the case in hand on the most
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come to the surface either in the pleadings, the evidence, or
the instructions given by the judge, and when they do, doubtless
ordinarily they merely give color to some more important factor,
or bundle of factors. But in whatever form they come up, the
judges constantly recognize them by reiterating that the question
was one for the jury and that they had the parties and witnesses
before them and their basis for judgment was necessarily more
complete than any paper record can provide. These factors in
single units become articulate in rare instances. They are so
normally common factors of every case that they are virtually
ignored. They lie beneath the formal statements of pleading, and
they are above the rules of evidence. How could they be kept
from the jury where they fill the interstices of all that is done
and said during a trial? The rules of evidence are primarily
rules of exclusion. All relevant facts are admissible unless some
specific rule forbids.5 - It may be that the factors in question
are seldom "evidence" in the procedural sense; they may be
mere "background" or "atmosphere." But what is weightier?
The law of evidence is rational; it would not undertake a vain
thing; it cannot deal with every factor pertinent to passing
judgment. It could not take formal notice of such numerous
and such variable details without wasting much effort to no
purpose. It is only when some of the more comprehensive
personal attributes as "knowledge" and "habit" - become involved
in this type of case that the law of evidence takes a hand, and
even then it more frequently refuses to do so.
What has been said as to the rules of evidence may be said
rational basis possible. See RANDALL, op. cit. supra note 17, c. "0; Dunkp
v. United States, 165 U. S. 486, 17 Sup. Ct. 375 (1S97); State v. runyan,
93 N. J. L. 16 (1919); THompsO.P , TRLIs (2d ed. 1912) § 2836 t r q.
No one thinks that they have more than a sobering effect, or that the
factors at the basis of judgment are erased in any such manncr.
34 See WIGMIOR, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 10. But also note the c nclu-
sion of Professor Edgerton: "The fact appears to be, not that the law of
evidence is so inept and inconsistent as to e:clude dirLct proof of thcZe
various mental facts while it admits direct proof of intention, but that, as
a matter of substantive law, these mental facts have no bearing on ncgli-
gence." Edgerton, op. cit. supra note 4, at 855.
35 State v. Mlanchester & Lawrence R. R., 52 N. H. 528, 532 (1872) ; Brouil-
lette v. Conn. River R. R., 162 Mass. 198, 38 N. E. 507 (1894). It would
seem that psychologists could not find a richer nor a more fruitful study
than the part these incidental factors play in jury verdicts. See Hutchins
and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidcncc-Spoatancom
Exclamations (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 432 and Some Obscrvations va the
Law of Evidence-emary (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 860. It is true that
much would have to depend upon the observer's capacity to intErprct human
behavior at large, but even so, such studies would be of incalculable value
both as to assessing the importance of the factors and as to suggesting




as to the giving of instructions. The law cannot deal with these
factors in detail; therefore, it ignores them. They merely make
up the "circumstances" '1 of the case, but here they get such
recognition as the jury may give them in the particular case.
It is only when a party wishes to get an advantage from stress-
ing some one of these qualities or characteristics which stands
out in a particular case that such a factor is given formal notice.
The judge may think the factor of no pertinency or of the great-
est pertinency in the particular case, but an admission or ex-
clusion from the formal evidence, or a charge or a refusal to
charge, in one instance, does not necessarily have any signifi-
cance in some other instance where the same factor may be in-
volved. The possible number of situations is so large that the
law cannot deal with them in advance of trial. And doubtless
the law is wise in not attempting to do poorly by rules what is
already better cared for as the accepted but unnoticed incidents
of every trial.
The difficulties of dealing with the other problems of negli-
gence cases-the right-duty problem, the damage problem, and
the causal relation problem-are not under consideration. Each
of them has its own difficulties. The problem here is that of
handling the issue of "wrongdoing", "breach of duty," the negli-
gence issue. The most obvious conclusion is that in the great
bulk of cases of this type there is no method of ascertaining
in advance whether conduct is negligent or non-negligent. At
most, a method has been devised for testing conduct after it
becomes known. The method is not difficult to state, but its
satisfactory employment must rest upon the capacity of judges
to know when it is applicable, and the capacity of juries to ex-
ercise a fair judgment on all the factors involved. As an ele-
36 City of Meridian v. McBeath, 80 Miss. 485, 32 So. 53 (1902) (plain-
tiff's forgetfulness of a post, one of the circumstances) ; Collins v. City of
Janesville, 111 Wis. 348, 87 N. W. 241 (1901); Slaughter v. Metropolitan
St. Ry., 116 Mo. 269, 278, 23 S. W. 760, 763 (1893) ("we know no rule of
law requiring them (the jury) in measuring his conduct at the time to
exclude from their consideration any of the natural instincts which usually
affect the conduct of men").
"If in a moment of forgetfulness, with her aged mind intent upon dis-
embarking, she did what otherwise she would not have done, she is not for
that reason necessarily subject to a charge of carelessness. It is a familiar
principle that one is not necessarily guilty of negligence who in a moment
of forgetfulness is injured by reason of a defect in a sidewalk, or a street
or other public place, though he had knowledge of its existence. 37 Cyc.
298. That people do in forgetfulness trip over unusual obstacles upon a
floor with which they are familiar, or stumble over unusual steps under like
circumstances, is a matter of common knowledge." Kitsap County Transp.
Co. v. Harvey, supra note 23, at 168. Thus courts may take judicial
notice of such things; a fortioi, a jury may also, when such matters are
pertinent.
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ment of legal responsibility it is at large, and defies the efforts
of legal scientists to bring it under more definite control. As
much as can be done is to state the process. The science of
law at this point requires nothing more, nor will it accept any-
thing less, than adherence to its processY'
3 7n dealing with the problem of causal relation in his recent bool,
GREEN, op. cit. supra note 1, the writer found it necessary to deal some-
what with the other problems of tort responsibility. But each of them
demands more than incidental treatment. So in the present article the
negligence issue alone has been considered. Shortly, a study of the right-
duty problem will be made by inquiring where the courts find the "duties"
about which they talk so much. The two problems so far handled have
developed little more than a "process;" they demand no sct rules esecpt
in terms of procedure. It may well be that the "law of negligence" is
so uncrystallized (except for an inconsequential part) that it cannot be
subjected to statement other than in terms of an analysis through which
the cases must be run as they arise. In other words, we may have a
process for passing judgment in negligence cases, but practically no "law
of negligence" beyond the process itself.
